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CAN SOCIAL TRINITARIANISM BE MONOTHEIST? 
A REPLY TO DALE TUGGY
William Hasker
Dale Tuggy has criticized my proposal for the doctrine of the Trinity, claim-
ing that social trinitarianism cannot be monotheistic. I present a counter- 
argument, and consider the ways in which Tuggy might respond to it.
According to Brian Leftow, a “hard task for ST [social trinitarianism] is 
providing an account of what mono theism is which both is intuitively ac-
ceptable and lets ST count as monotheist.”1 Dale Tuggy agrees, and he is 
convinced that the task cannot be accomplished.2 Tuggy’s criticisms of my 
view of the Trinity are numerous and complex, and a full response would 
require more space than is available here. (For additional detail, readers 
are referred to my book, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God.3) It is pos-
sible, however, to give a brief response to the central challenge concerning 
monotheism.
The fundamental premise in Tuggy’s critique is that a god, or a God, is 
and must be a single divine person, a single “center of knowledge, will, 
love, and action.”4 If there is more than one divine person, there is more 
than one God—hence, polytheism. The social trinitarian conception of 
God as a Trinity of closely related persons cannot, then, qualify as mono-
theistic. If this premise is granted, all the rest of the criticisms become 
unnecessary. Now, I have never been able to understand why unitarians 
like Tuggy should be entitled to fix the definition of monotheism, so as to 
rule out trinitarians as being monotheists. (At least, those trinitarians who 
recognize Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as distinct persons—and as Tuggy 
1Brian Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the 
Trinity, ed. Thomas McCall and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
52–88; the quoted passage is on 55.
2See Dale Tuggy, “Hasker’s Quests for a Viable Social Theory,” Faith and Philosophy 30:2 
(2013).
3William Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013).
4I borrow this phrasing from Cornelius Plantinga; also following Plantinga, I understand 
social trinitarianism to be the view that the Persons of the Trinity are distinct persons in this 
sense. See Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” in Trinity, Incarnation, and 
Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plant-
inga, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 22.
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admits, there have been many such trinitarians.5) Historically, Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam have been recognized as the three great monothe-
istic religions, and Christianity has been trinitarian at least since the third 
century—and before that binitarian almost from the very beginning. In 
any case, there is a concise argument which I, at least, find convincing, 
to the effect that social trinitarianism should indeed be recognized as a 
version of monotheism. Here is the argument:
1. The beliefs and worship practices of the early Christian communi-
ties, as depicted in the writings of the New Testament, constitute a 
valid and acceptable form of monotheism.
2. The early Christians perceived God the Father and Jesus Christ as 
distinct persons—as “distinct centers of know ledge, will, love, and 
action.”
3. The early Christians exhibit a pattern of “binitarian” belief and wor-
ship, in which Jesus is honored, praised, and worshiped along with 
God the Father.
4. No non-divine person can properly be the recipient of divine wor-
ship. Therefore,
5. There is a valid and acceptable version of monotheism in which 
there is more than one divine person.
If this argument is accepted, we have a definitive answer to Leftow’s chal-
lenge to provide “an account of what monotheism is which both is in-
tuitively acceptable and lets ST count as mono theist.” The argument does 
not, to be sure, provide an analytic definition of monotheism in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions; this is often difficult when we are 
dealing with broad-ranging and complex historical phenomena such 
as monotheism. (Compare “revolution.”) Rather, it points to a concrete 
historical exemplar, a “paradigm case” against which other claims con-
cerning the phenomenon can be measured.
I don’t expect the argument to be convincing to Tuggy; I am less certain 
about Leftow. Leftow, I think, would be willing to accept (1), and (2) is a 
simple matter of reading the New Testament; objections at that point are 
most unpromising. Nor will he, as a trinitarian, deny premise (4); this, 
after all, was what the Arian controversy was about. So if Leftow is going 
5Consider the following from Gregory of Nyssa, one of the leaders among the fourth-
century “pro-Nicene” fathers:
The Jewish dogma is destroyed by the acceptance of the Word, and the belief in the 
Spirit; while the polytheistic error of the Greek school is made to vanish by the unity 
of the Nature abrogating this imagination of plurality. While yet again, of the Jewish 
conception, let the unity of the Nature stand; and of the Hellenistic, only the distinc-
tion as to persons; the remedy against a profane view being thus applied, as required, 
on either side. (The Great Catechism, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 6, 477)
Gregory approves here of the Greek doctrine of “the distinction as to persons”; assuredly, the 
many gods of the Greeks were quite distinct personalities.
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to reject the argument, his point of attack will have to be premise (3)—and 
that premise, in any case, calls for a bit of discussion. The premise alludes 
to New Testament scholarship which finds in the texts the phenomenon of 
“Christological monotheism”—a practice of Christian belief and worship 
in which Jesus is placed alongside the God of Israel as a focus of wor-
ship and devotion.6 My brief discussion of this topic here draws on the 
massive, and highly respected, work by Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: 
Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity.7 Hurtado shows, through the ex-
amination of New Testament texts in their historical context, that what we 
have in the life of the early Church is a pattern of devotion to Jesus such 
that “when this constellation of devotional actions is set in the general 
first-century religious context, it is properly understood as constituting 
the cultic worship of Jesus.”8 What we have here, in fact, is a pattern of 
“binitarian worship”—worship of Jesus along with the Father—and one 
that originated surprisingly early in the newborn Christian movement. 
This pattern is evident in the earliest Christian writings we have, the letters 
of Paul, and is most plausibly seen as having originated in the very earliest 
days of the Christian movement. It is noteworthy, furthermore, that Paul, 
no shrinking violet when it came to controversy, felt no need to justify or de-
fend his exalted view of Jesus—as seen, for instance, in Philippians 2:5–11. 
Rather, he presents this under standing of Jesus as something his readers 
will already be familiar with and will readily accept, something which he 
therefore can use as a basis for his appeal to them for Christlike attitudes 
and conduct.
A striking portrayal of such binitarian worship can be found in the 
slightly later book of Revelation. In 5:11–13 we find the heavenly host 
worshiping the Lamb along with God: “Worthy is the Lamb that was slaugh-
tered to receive power and wealth and wisdom and might and honor and 
glory and blessing! . . . To the one seated on the throne and to the Lamb be 
blessing and honor and glory and might forever and ever!” (Note by way 
of contrast that the exalted angels who are instructing the seer specifically 
forbid his offering worship to them (19:10; 22:8–9).) Without doubt, this 
description of the heavenly worship provided a template for the worship 
that was to be offered, and that was in fact offered, in the churches for 
whom the book was written. The limitations of the present paper prevent 
me from deploying the evidence at all fully; readers are strongly encour-
aged to consult Hurtado’s very readable work for the overall picture.
We have, then, the spectacle of the early Christians offering cultic worship 
to Jesus along with the Father, something which Jews had never done to any 
of the “divine agents” (angels, exalted patriarchs, and so on) that play a 
6A selection of essays on this topic may be found in The Jewish Roots of Christological Mono-
theism: Papers from the St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship of Jesus, ed. 
Carey C. Newman, James R. Davila, and Gladys S. Lewis (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
7Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2003).
8Ibid., 138.
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role in some of their traditions. Given this, along with the other premises, 
the conclusion of the argument stated above seems to be fully justified: we 
have monotheistic worship in which Jesus is honored and glorified along 
with, and in the same way as, God the Father.
How might opponents of social trinitarianism respond to this argu-
ment? I doubt that Leftow will want to deny the first premise; to do so 
would align his views  with those of the Jewish authorities who, sometime 
during the first century, expelled Jewish Christians from the synagogue 
because of their excessive exaltation of Jesus. As a trinitarian, he will not 
wish to deny premise (4). If he wishes nevertheless to reject the conclusion, 
he will have to contest the historical case for premise (3) made by Hurtado 
and his fellow scholars. I must confess that I am doubtful of the success 
of such a venture, but anyone is welcome to make the attempt. For Tuggy, 
on the other hand, the situation is more complex. To be sure, he also could 
contest the historical evidence for premise (3). (In fact, however, he does 
not disagree with this premise.) Another option, favored by theological 
liberals, is to deny (at least implicitly) premise (1). Jesus, it is sometimes 
said, was by no means the cosmic redeemer featured in some of the later 
New Testament texts; rather, he was a simple teacher, Cynic sage, or . . . 
[insert here your own preferred characterization], who would have been 
shocked at the extravagant claims made about him by later Christians. His 
more authentic followers were those who gathered around his teachings 
and honored him without the excesses of later speculation. Proposals such 
as this are interesting, to be sure, though they are handi capped by the se-
rious lack of historical evidence that anything of the sort actually occurred. 
But these speculations, if accepted, do free contem po rary Christians from 
the need to acknowledge the high christology of the New Testament as 
authentically monotheistic.
Having said this, I do not believe Tuggy wishes to avail himself of this 
option. Tuggy is not a liberal; his views are best described as “biblical 
unitarianism.”9 He accepts the writings of Scripture as genuinely the word 
of God, and seeks to understand and affirm their teachings. There is, how-
ever, another strategy for avoiding the argument given above which he 
does adopt. That way is to accept the truth of premises (1)–(3) but to deny 
premise (4). That is to say: he can admit that Jesus was worshiped along 
with God, as the texts clearly imply, and yet deny that this means that Jesus 
is a divine person, in the sense affirmed by trinitarians. Here we may think 
of the Arians and other subordinationists in the ancient Church. They did 
worship Jesus, and regarded him as in some sense divine, but not in the 
same sense that the Father was divine. (The Son/Logos was God, but not 
“true God,” a fact which accounts for the presence of the latter expression 
in the Nicene Creed.) So the Logos was worshiped, but was not (fully) a 
divine person.
9See www.biblicalunitarian.com (Tuggy, however, has no formal affiliation with the 
group that sponsors this website).
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Tuggy, however, is no Arian. Nor does he think that there are semi-
divine beings (God’s “near-peers”) somehow bridging the gap between 
God and the created world. Like most modern unitarians,10 he holds that 
Jesus is, ontologically, a human being and nothing more—though to be 
sure, a very special human being, one that was uniquely blessed by God 
and used by God—and one that, in view of this, is a proper recipient of 
worship. Tuggy thus denies the claim made by premise (4), which is axi-
omatic to Nicene trinitarians and to many others, that only God should 
be worshiped.11 And this brings me to my final conundrum concerning 
Tuggy’s position, something which I am simply at a loss to under stand. He 
believes that this view of Jesus, as ontologically human and nothing more, 
is the view that is found in the writings of the New Testament, rightly in-
terpreted; such a view is fully compatible with the praises of Jesus and the 
worship of Jesus that are there recorded. This is what is being said about 
Jesus in John 1:1–18, and Philippians 2:5–11, and Hebrews 1:1–14, and in 
many other passages. But how he is able to convince himself of this, I am 
unable to comprehend.12
Huntington University
10The qualification is needed because Tuggy classifies as “unitarians” all the ancient 
writers who thought the Son/Logos was ontologically subordinate to the Father / God, from 
Tertullian and Origen to the Arians and anti-Nicenes of the fourth century. I think this is 
a gerrymandered classification that fails to mark the significant divisions in the history of 
doctrine, but I will not argue that point here.
11For a discussion of this, see Tuggy’s article, “Who Should Christians Worship?” in 
Journal from the Radical Reformation, 2013.
12My thanks to Dale Tuggy for his comments on an earlier version of this reply.  Thanks 
also to Joseph Jedwab and another (unnamed) referee, and to the editor of Faith and Phi-
losophy, for their comments.
